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NOTE 
DEPENDENT ORIGINATION, FREE WILL, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
by - Nathan Katz 
The law of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) is the 
manner in which things come to be. All things· (meaning both objects 
and events) are conditioned, e.g., they do not co~e from nothing. Being 
proceeds from beings, not from non-being. However, "being" might 
imply some entity which is abiding and permanent, so we would be 
more correct in saying that "becoming" proceeds from "becoming". 
If we say that something is (implying being), we are infact contradicting 
the law of dependent origination. 
To say that something is implies that it always has been and always 
will be: for how can something "not-be" at any time that now is? This 
implies that creation is denied by this principle and such is indeed the 
case. "Being" implies "non-being" for if something is, we are able 
to conceive of it nat - beine. And how can we proceed from not-being 
to being without creation? Thus Buddhaist speak of "becoming" 
rather then "being". 
An event "becomes" from other "becomings". Consistent 
with Jhe doctrine of tri]akshana (that all things are impermanent non-
essential and unsatisfactory, the law of dependent odgination points 
to the moment. Something is only for an infinitessimal monment in 
time. We can never, in fact, pin something down long enough to say 
that it "is". Reality, then, is ultimate momentariness. 
In human terms, dependent origination accounts for changes in 
life (every moment is change), for the origin of. change (from a prior 
link, or nidana, of the chain), and for the fruit of change (as a later 
nidana of the chain). All of this is described in a very general manner. 
We see that any action which can be traced back to the root-cause of 
ignorance (as can all unenlightened actions) yields wme binding remlt, 
however vague. Here we see the beginning of the controversy of free 
wi11 and moral responsibility. Moral responsibility applies inasmuch 
as our actions yield fruits. Governed by the impersonal law of karma, 
these fruits are unavoidable and adsolutely moral. No "immoral" 
god can alleviate us of our karma by means of grace (as is the case in Vaish-
navism and Christianity). 
By the same token we are free. Weare free to act in such a 
manner so as to have healthy fruits (more properly, we may do healthy 
actions which yield concommitant fruits). While the past to some 
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extent determines the present, by nature of the very momentariness of 
the present we are free to act in any manner to create our future. How-
ever, the emphasis of the Buddhist notion of freedom is not the future: 
freedom lies in the moment in which we act. Our past actions lead 
us to the moment, but in this moment we are free. Yet we remain 
responsible for the fruits of our actions in the future. 
All of this points to an interesting restatement of the problem .. 
Can there be free will without moral responsibility? Certainly there is 
no moral responsibility unless there is free will, as the Ajivika philoso-
phers have demonstrated. (For a discussion of Ajivika doctrine, see· 
Barua, History cif Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosoph'y.) Since everything in 
their system is pre-determined, man must act as he acts and there is no 
question of free will. But does free will imply moral responsibility? 
Western philosophers have distinguished between "freedom 
from" and freedom for". The former is a negative notion, as "free-
dom from" something implies merely that we should rid ourselves of 
the thing from which we want to be free (such as social convention, the 
academic world, or military service). It alw implies being inas-
much as we have broken a link of causation : that by this action we have. 
become free from it, and thus our action is no longer conditioned, Le., 
is no longer in the chain of dependent origination and to which we may 
then apply the concept of "being" as opposed to "becoming" . 
"Freedom for" is a much more positive concept. It implies 
that we want freedom in order to do something (e.g., social service, 
teaching, etc). Here "becoming" is affirmed, as this notion of free-
dom remains conditioned and conditioning. With which type of free-
dom is Buddhism concerned ? 
Early Buddhists speak of freedom from dukkha, e.g., nirvana. 
By removing the causes of suffering one becomes free. This has wide 
implications. According to the law of dependent origination, freedom 
from suffering implies freedom from ignorance which implies wisdom, 
or nirvana. The early Buddhists apply the category of "being" to 
nirvana. This is one approach to the problem. 
Mahayana Buddhists, by the Vow of the Boddhisattva, imply 
freedom Jor something, e.g., leading all sentient beings to nirvana, 
freedom for the practice of mahakaruna. This implies moral respon-
sibility for, according to Mahayana Buddhism, no other "freedom" is 
truly free. This also implies "becoming", as freedom conditioned by 
mahakaruna in turn conditions the leading of all beings to nirvana. One 
must act according to the principle of mahakaruna, and in this lies free-
dom. Thus Mahayana Buddhists do not apply the category of "being" 
to nirvana; rather it is in the negation of all four categories of 'being' 
that nirvana is found. (See Nagarjuna, Mulamadh'yalllika-karika). 
According to early Buddhism, we are free if we truly recognize 
momentariness and all its implications. But this does not imply that 
this free, momentary action does not yield fruit. A free action has its 
consequences. We are told that Lord Buddha is free from suffering 
(suffering might mean the fruit of action). Yet it is inconceivable that 
the Enlightened One would act contrary to morality, although he is not 
bound by good and evil. Perhaps we must make the long jump to Japa-
nese Zen Buddhism, where the Master is asked if the Buddha is bound by 
karma. The reply is that the Buddha is one with (e.g., non-differentdiated) 
karma. I think that the Theravadin, like the Mahayanist, would not 
disagree with this statement. 
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